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ANALYSIS OF RECENT PROPOSALS TO
RECONFIGURE HATCH-WAXMAN
Laura]. Robinson*
The rising costs of prescription medicines are of great concern to many
Americans, especially our nation's growing population of seniors. As the prices
of brand name prescription drugs rise astronomically,' many citizens and
politicians are pushing for legislative or regulatory changes that would increase
access to more affordable generic alternatives. Although the desire to increase the
availability of lower priced drugs is a legitimate goal, it is important to recognize
the tremendous costs involved in the invention and development of new brand
name drugs, which are estimated to be between $800 million and $1 billion per
drug.2 Therefore, when making changes to the existing drug patent laws,
legislators and administrators should seek to maintain a balance between
increasing access to cheaper generic drugs and ensuring the continued develop-
ment of new drugs by our nation's pharmaceutical companies through the
preservation of strong patent rights.
The 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,
commonly referred to as Hatch-Waxman,3 was enacted to achieve this important
balance between generic manufacturers and brand name pharmaceutical
companies. It was designed to assist the entry of generics onto the market while
simultaneously protecting the brand name manufacturer's incentive to invent.
* Laura Robinson has over a decade of experience in molecular pharmacology and drug
discovery. Her research has involved exploring the phenomena of multi-drug resistance and
designing and developing new high-throughput screening assays for the pharmaceutical industry.
In addition to studyinglaw at the University of Connecticut School of Law, she is the primary author
of several scientific publications. Ms. Robinson would like to thank Steven Wilf for his comments
on an earlier draft of this Artide.
' Last year, according to a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study, these costs were
estimated to be $438 billion over ten years. The CBO was created by the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, and it began operating on February 24, 1975. The CBO's
mission is to provide the Congress with the objective, timely, nonpartisan analyses needed for
economic and budget decisions and with the information and estimates required for the
congressional budget process.
2 Fed. Trade Comm'n Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, i (uly
2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf [hereinafter An FTC
Study].
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417,98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35
U.S.C.) (amending the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat.
1040 (1938) (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. § 301-397 (2000)).
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For the most part, Hatch-Waxman has been successful in achieving its goal of
assisting generics onto the market, as generics now comprise more than forty-
seven percent of the market as opposed to only nineteen percent prior to the
law's enactment.4 In addition, geneics are projected to comprise fifty-seven
percent of the market by 2005.'
In effect, the Hatch-Waxman amendments created the modem generic drug
industry. As a result of the Act, generic manufacturers can avoid the huge costs
associated with developing a new drug. Bringing a generic drug to market costs
only about $1 million, as opposed to the $800 million to $1 billion required to
bring a new brand name drug to market.6 Because of the benefits that Hatch-
Waxman provides to generic companies, the generic industry continues to thrive.
7
In the almost twenty years since its enactment, however, there has been
increasing criticism that pharmaceutical companies attempt to evade the spirit of
Hatch-Waxman by manipulating loopholes that exist in the law to extend the lives
of their patents and delay the entry of generics onto the market. In response,
Congress recently proposed changes to Hatch-Waxman. The most sweeping
proposal, The Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act (GAAP), was
approved in the Senate by a vote of 78-21 on July 31, 2002.' The proposal
received little attention in the House last year, but it was reintroduced by the
108th Congress on January 7, 2003.' New regulatory changes have also been
proposed by the Bush administration. In October 2002, at a surprise Rose
Garden ceremony, President George W. Bush proposed new Federal Drug
Administration (FDA) regulations that would alter the delicate compromise that
Hatch-Waxman sought to achieve between pharmaceutical companies and their
generic competitors."U These new FDA rules were finalized in June 2003.1
4 An FTC Study, supra note 2, at i.
s Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), The Hatch-Waxman Act in
Perspective at 5 (2002), available at http://www.anon.mindsharespeedera.net/anon.mindshare/
phrmadev/publications/polcy/2002-06.-24.435.pdf.
6 Id at 4.
7 Id
' The Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act S. 812, 107th Cong. (2002). There
is other related legislation proposed in the House as well, such as The Greater Access to Affordable
Pharmaceuticals Act H.R. 1862,107th Congress (2002) and The Prescription Drug Affordability Act
H.R. 5311, 107th Cong. (2002), but the Senate bill is the one most often discussed and the only one
that was voted on and approved.
' The Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act S. 54,108th Cong. (2003). The new
bill was re-introduced by Senators McCain and Schumer and referred to the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions.
" Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug: Patent Listing Requirements and
Application of 30-Month Stays on Approval ofAbbreviated New Drug Applications Certifying That
a Patent Claiming a Drug is Invalid or Will Not be Infringed, 67 Fed. Reg. 65448 (proposed Oct.
[Vol. 11:47
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Part I of this Article provides an overview of the objectives of the Hatch-
Waxman Act and the balances it seeks to establish between generic manufacturers
and brand name pharmaceutical companies. Part II outlines the various strategies
that pharmaceutical companies have devised to evade the spirit ofHatch-Waxman
and keep generics off the market and how generic companies attempt to game the
system as well. Part II also includes an analysis of recent case law involving abuse
of Hatch-Waxman's 180-day exclusivity provision and abuse of Hatch-Waxman's
thirty-month stay provision through improper listings in the Orange Book. 2 For
discussion of the 180-day exclusivity provision, case law analysis will focus onAbbott v. Geneva, Hoechst Marion Roussel v. Andrx, and Schering-Plough v. Upsher-
Smith.13 For discussion of the thirty-month stay provision, case law analysis will
focus on Myan Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson'4 and Andrx Pharmaceuticals v. Biovail
Corporation.5 This section also addresses the role the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) played in these cases.' 6
24, 2002) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314). The deadline for comments to the FDA was
December 23, 2002. The FDA had also proposed regulatory changes to the 180-day exclusivity
provision back in 1999, but a final rule never issued. 64 Fed. Reg. 42873. See also Steve Seidenberg,
Rule on Generics Faces Hurdks: Asproposed by Bush, the regulation ould change pro visions of Hatch- Waxman,
26 NAT'LL.J. 12, Nov. 11 th, 2002 at 3 (commenting on the peculiarity of a presidential Rose Garden
ceremony to announce on FDA regulatory proposal).
" Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug- Patent Submission and Listing
Requirements and Application of 30-Month Stays on Approval of Abbreviated Certifying that a
Patent Claiming the Drug is Invalid or Will Not Be Infringed, 68 Fed. Reg. 36676 (June 18, 2003)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314) [hereinafter New Drug Application-Final Version]. See also
Bush Rleases FinalFDA Drug Patent Rule, 2003 WL 10134624 WASHINGTON DRUG LE TER,June
16, 2003 (announcing release of new FDA rule, with reactions to some of its provisions).
" The Orange Book is another name for the listings of approved drug patents. It is also known
as the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations publication. 21 U.S.C.
355(b)(1) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2002).
13 Complaint, In re Abbott Labs. & Geneva Pharm. (FTC Dkt. No. C-3945) (May 22, 2000).
Complaint, In re Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. & Andrx Corp. (FTC Dkt. No. 9293) (Mar. 16,2000).
Complaint, In rr Schering-Plough Corp. & Am. Home Prod. (FTC Dkt. No. 9297) (Mar. 30, 2001).
It is important to note that these three examples all arose out of patent infringement litigation
between the pharmaceutical company and the generic company, but none of these cases ever reached
court. Instead, each settled by entering into alleged anticompetitive agreements, and this section
discusses the FTC actions that arose as a result of the alleged anticompetitive settlements. On the
other hand, the disputes involving the thirty-month stay provision were actually litigated in court in
addition to having the FTC component.
14 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323,60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1576 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
15 Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368,61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1414 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
16 Federal Trade Commission's mission: "The Commission seeks to ensure that the nation's
markets function competitively, and are vigorous, efficient, and free of undue restrictions." See FTC,
A BeiefOverview of the Federal Trade Commissions Investigative andLaw EnforcementAuthoii, at 1, available
at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.htm (Sept. 2002) (discussing the role and authority of the
20031
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The remainder of this Article considers abuse of the thirty-month stay
provision. Part IV summarizes the recent FTC study, which discusses the abuse
of the thirty-month stay provision and establishes that the abuse is simply not that
prevalent. 17 Part V analyzes two of the recent proposals to amend the thirty-
month stay provision of Hatch-Waxman. This final section compares The
Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals (GAAP) Act' with President
Bush's new FDA rules. In particular, it discusses the effects that each would have
on the careful balance established by Hatch-Waxman and argues that the GAAP
Act goes too far in shifting that balance toward generics while the proposed new
FDA rules will be unenforceable and ineffective. Finally, this section suggests
increased FDA and FTC involvement as an alternative proposal to police the
more flagrant abuses. Ultimately, the best solution would create greater access to
more affordable generic prescription medications while preserving the patent
rights of brand name manufacturers so that they continue to have proper
incentives for developing newlife-saving and ife-enhancing pharmaceutical drugs.
I. HISTORY AND OBJECTIVES OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG AND COSMETICS ACT
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics
Act were enacted to encourage the entry of more affordable generics onto the
market while protecting the incentives for brand name drug manufacturers to
invent. The Amendments seek to achieve this goal by providing benefits for
generic companies to encourage them to bring their generic drugs to market while
preserving the rights of the brand name patent holders.
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments have been very successful, and both the
generic industry and the pharmaceutical industry continue to thrive. Within seven
months of Hatch-Waxman's enactment, the FDA received eight hundred new
applications for generic drugs. 9 From the date of enactment in 1984, over ten
FTC).
17 An FTC Study, supra note 2, at ii. The study focused on instances between the years of 1992
to 2000 in which generic applicants filed applications with the FDA seeking to make and sell a drug
before the brand name drug patent expired. To accomplish this, the Commission subpoenaed
documents and information from brand name manufacturers and generic manufacturers. The brand
name drug products included in the study include the following blockbuster drugs: Capoten,
Cardizem CD, Cipro, Claritin, Lupron, Neurontin, Paxil, Pepcid, Pravacol, Prilosec, Procardia XL,
Prozac, Vasotec, Xanax, Zantac, Zocor, Zoloft, and Zyprexa.
IS S. 812, 107th Cong. (2002), S. 54 108th Cong. (2003).
19 ROY LEVY, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: A DISCUSSION OF COMPETITIVE AND
ANTITRUST ISSUES IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF CHANGE, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS 12 (1999) (The
Bureau of Economics helps the FTC evaluate the economic impact of its actions by providing
economic analysis and support to antitrust and consumer protection investigations).
[Vol. 11:47
4
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol11/iss1/9
HATCH-WAXMAN
thousand new generic drugs have entered the American pharmaceutical market,
and today almost one hundred percent of brand name drugs that have gone off
patent have at least one generic counterpart available.2" Since generic drugs are
on average half the price of their brand name counterparts, the consumer savings
are considerable.2" The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that
the availability of generic drugs in 1994 alone saved consumers between $8 billion
and $10 billion.22 With more patents set to expire over the next few years, these
consumer cost savings are expected to increase significantly.23
The reason for Hatch-Waxman's success is the balance it achieves between
pharmaceutical companies and their generic competitors. The following
discussion outlines some of the counterbalancing benefits that the Amendments
provide to both generic manufacturers and brand name pharmaceutical
manufacturers.
A. BENEFITS TO GENERIC MANUFACTURERS
Hatch-Waxman provides three major benefits to generic manufacturers: (1)
the abbreviated new drug application (ANDA);24 (2) the right to make and test the
generic version of a drug before the expiration of the brand name patent;2 and
(3) the incentive of receiving 180 days of exclusivity for being the first generic on
the market.26
20 PrwmongAvailabiko ofLowerCost Generic Drgs Before Comm. onSenateJudiiat (2003) (Statement
of Dan Troy, Chief Counsel for the FDA), available at LEXIS, News Library Federal Document
Clearing House Cong. Testimony File. On the other hand, before Hatch-Waxman, in the year 1983,
only thirty-five percent of brand name drugs that had gone off patent had a generic counterpart
available. Congressional Budget Office, How Increased Competitionfrom Generic Drgs Has AffectedPrices
and Returns in the PharmacetticalIndusthy 37 (1998), available at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/6xx/doc655/pharm.
pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
2 Lauran Neergaard, New Ruks Promise Faster Generic Drugs, June 12, 2003, available at LEXIS,
News Library, AP File.
' Congressional Budget Office, supra note 20, at 31. These figures were calculated as follows:
The CBO assumed that all prescriptions would have been filled with the brand name drug if the
generic was not available. The price difference between the innovator and geneic version was
multiplied by the number of generic prescriptions dispensed for that drug. This process was
repeated for all drugs that had a generic version available and all of the savings to the consumer were
added together. The data set used for this analysis was drugs sold in retail pharmacies. Since this
only accounts for seventy percent of total drug sales, the actual savings are probably even higher.
2 Jean P. Fisher, As Patents Expire, Generic Drugs Will Get Boost, Aug. 17, 2003, availabL atLEXIS,
News Library, Scripps Howard News Service File.
u 21 U.S.C. S 3550)(2)(A) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a) (2002).
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
21 U.S.C. § 3556)(5)(B)(iv) (2000).
2003]
5
Robinson: Analysis of Recent Proposals to Reconfigure Hatch-Waxman
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2016
J. INTELL PROP. L
1. AbbreviatedNew DrugApplication. ANDA. Before the enactment of Hatch-
Waxman, getting a generic approved by the FDA was difficult. The generic
manufacturer had to perform the same safety and efficacy tests as the brand name
company before its generic could get approved."7 One of the benefits that Hatch-
Waxman provides to generic manufacturers is the creation of a streamlined
approach to FDA approval.2" Under Hatch-Waxman, the generic manufacturer
only must demonstrate to the FDA that its drug is the "bio-equivalent" of the
brand name drug.29 This procedure, called an abbreviated new drug application,
or ANDA, is less costly and less time-consuming to the generic manufacturer.'
2. Exception to the General Rule of Patent Infringement. The second way that
Hatch-Waxman encourages generic manufacturers to bring their drugs to market
is by creating an exception to the general rule against patent infringement. Before
the enactment of Hatch-Waxman, a generic manufacturer could not begin making
and testing a generic drug until after the brand name manufacturer's patent
expired. Title 35 of the United States Code dictates that "whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention... during the
term of the patent . . . infringes the patent."' Hatch-Waxman creates an
exception to this general rule for generic drug manufacturers, which is codified
at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e). 2 This provision, commonly referred to as the Bolar
Amendment, says: "It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to
use, or sell within the United States.. . a patented invention.., solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a
federal law which regulates the manufacture ... of drugs..".. " This provision
essentially allows generic drug manufacturers to infringe brand name manufactur-
ers' patents for purposes of obtaining FDA approval. No other industry enjoys
this privilege to be exempt from blatant acts of patent infringement. 4 Allowing
generic manufacturers to make and test their drugs before the expiration of the
brand name patent creates more incentive for them to develop their generic drugs
2? Congressional Budget Office, supra note 20, at 3.
21 U.S.C. § 3550)(2)(A) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a) (2002).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(7) (2002). Bioequivalence means that
the active ingredient is absorbed at the same rate and to the same extent for the generic drug as for
the innovator drug. See also Congressional Budget Office, supra note 20, at 3.
21 U.S.C. § 3550)(2)(A) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a) (2002).
31 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
32 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). The Bolar Amendment overrode a 1984 Federal Circuit
decision, Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), in which the court held against the generic
industry.
33 Id
3' Gene. Drags with a Fous o, Assrnng GrattrArces to Affordable PharmaceuticalS: Heaing Befor
the Senate Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. (2002), available in 2002 WL
1067890 (F.D.C.H.) (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch).
[Vol. 11:47
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and bring them to the FDA for approval. Prior to enactment of the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments, bringing the generic to market took two to three years
after the expiration of a brand name drug's patent.3" Now, as a result of both
Hatch-Waxman's abbreviated new drug application and the fact that a generic
manufacturer can now test and manufacture its drug prior to the expiration of the
brand name manufacturer's patent, that time period has been reduced to only
three months.3"
3. 180-Dqy Marketing Exdusivity Benefit. As a third incentive for generic
manufacturers to bring their drugs to market, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
provide the generic company that is first to file its ANDA with the FDA 180 days
of marketing exclusivity." This is an enticing incentive to generic manufacturers
because during this time of no other generic competition, the generic company
first to file can sell its drug for a much higher price than it could if several other
generic alternatives were on the market. This period of exclusivity begins when
the first generic company begins selling its generic.3"
B. BENEFITS TO BRAND NAME PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS
In addition to establishing mechanisms to assist generics onto the market,
legislators recognized the need to encourage the continued development of new
drugs by brand name manufacturers. Accordingly, they attempted to create
balance within the Hatch-Waxman Amendments by providing benefits to pioneer
companies and taking steps to preserve the patent rights that pharmaceutical
companies have on their brand name drugs.
1. Increases in Patent Term for BrandName Manufacturer. First, Hatch-Waxman
provides brand name pharmaceutical manufacturers with the ability to restore
some of the patent term lost during clinical testing and FDA approval.39 The
" Congressional Budget Office, supra note 20, at 3.
36 id.
, 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(B)(iv) (2000).
u Or the date of a court decision (either a district court or an appellate court). 21 U.S.C. § 355
(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000).
If the application contains a certification in subclause (IV) of paragraph
(2) (A) (vii) and is for a drug for which a previous application has been submitted
under this subsection continuing such a certification, the application shall be
made effective not earlier than one hundred and eighty days after--(i) the date
the Secretary receives notice from the applicant under the previous application
of the first commercial marketing of the drug or (ii) the date of a decision of a
court in an action described in clause (iii) holding that the patent which is the
subject of the certification to be invalid or not infringed, whichever is earlier.
Id
19 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000). See generalty Congressional Budget Office, spra note 20, at 38
2003]
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average length of patent term for brand name manufacturers rose by over two
years after the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.Y More specifically, the brand name
manufacturer now gets back half of the time the drug spent in clinical testing4
and all of the time spent in FDA review.4" Further, if the FDA requires any
supplemental clinical investigations, then it can grant up to three more years of
patent term extensions, and drugs that contain a new chemical entity43 can qualify
for additional patent term benefits as well.'
Another benefit that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments provide to pioneer
companies is the ability to tack an additional six months onto their patent term
in exchange for testing their drugs in the pediatric population." During this six-
month period, the FDA cannot approve a generic version of the drug.4 6 This
provision was intended to compensate for the lack of information on the effects
of certain drugs in children and to contribute to the balance that Hatch-Waxman
seeks to establish between brand name manufacturers and generic companies.
This provision can provide a substantial benefit to brand name manufacturers
because the six-month extension applies to every formulation, dosage form, and
indication of the drug that contains the same active ingredient.47
(discussing trends in patent term extensions under the Hatch-Waxman Act).
Congressional Budget Office, supra note 20, at 39. According to the Patent and Trademark
Office, the average patent term remaining to brand name manufacturers left after FDA approval rose
from an average of nine years to an average of 11.5 years. (Of course, this increase in patent term
is not a windfall for pharmaceutical manufacturers because the ANDA process for generic
manufacturers established by Hatch-Waxman decreases the time of generic entry onto the market
after patent expiration by approximately three years. So the benefits to generic manufacturers and
pharmaceutical manufacturers are roughly offset in this respect).
" Clinical trials are divided into three phases. Phase I tests the compound in fewer than 100
healthy volunteers to determine safe dosage levels and toxicity. Phase II tests the compound in 50-
200 people who have the disease to determine both safety and efficacy. Phase III tests the drug in
thousands of people to determine whether or not the results are statistically significant.
42 The average patent extension is two-three years. However, a patent term extension cannot
exceed five years. In addition, the total patent term of a new drug can never exceed fourteen years.
Congressional Budget Office, supra note 20, at 40; PhRMA, supra note 5, at 5-6 (quoting Sheila
Shulman et al., Patent Term Rextoration. The Impact ofthe Hatch-laxwan Act on New Drugs and Biolo~gc
Approved 1984-1995, 2J. BIOLAW&Bus. 63,66 (1999)). Notice that this maximum of fourteen years
of exclusivity for a drug patent is still less than the term given to other non-drug inventions, which
is usually closer to seventeen years (twenty years from filing date).
' PhRMA, supra note 5, at 5-6. A new chemical entity, or NCE, is the name for a drug that
contains an active ingredient that the FDA has never before approved.
" Id When the FDA approves an NCE, no generic application is accepted for five years.
21 U.S.C. S 355(a) (2000); Thomas Parker & Amy Manning, Best PharwaceuticalrforChildrenAct
is Now Law, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 15, 2002, at C8.
46 Parker & Manning, supra note 45, at C8. This is called the pediatric exdusivity provision.
"' Id For example, if a brand name manufacturer has a patent on an oral formulation, an
intravenous formulation and a topical cream, all containing the same active ingredient, then an
[Vol. 11:47
8
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol11/iss1/9
HATCH- W1AXMAN
Under Hatch-Waxman, another benefit accorded to brand name manufactur-
ers is seven years of exclusivity and tax incentives if their drug qualifies for orphan
drug status.4" Orphan drug status is attributed to a medicine that treats a disease
that less than 200,000 Americans suffer from.49 This benefit is designed to
encourage the research and development of new drugs in these less lucrative
areas.50 It also restores some of the balance to brand name manufacturers under
Hatch-Waxman. According to the Congressional Budget Office, when all of
these benefits are averaged,"' generic entry is postponed for 2.8 years.5 2
2. Thirty-Month Stay Provision. Another major benefit that the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments provide to brand name pharmaceutical companies is known as the
thirty-month stay provision. 3 As part of the abbreviated new drug approval
process, the generic manufacturer must certify one of four paragraphs concerning
the brand name patented drug listed in the Orange Book. A paragraph I
certification asserts that the listed drug is not patented; a paragraph II certification
states that the listed drug has expired; a paragraph III certification indicates that
the generic drug will not enter the market before the patent term of the listed
drug expires; and a paragraph IV certification filed by the generic company
indicates its belief that the brand name patent listed in the Orange Book is invalid
or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new generic drug.
s4
An ANDA submitted for approval to the FDA with a paragraph IV
certification is the primary focus of this Article. This is the provision used to
challenge a brand name drug manufacturer's patent. When a generic manufac-
turer files an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification, notice must be provided
additional six months of time will be added to the term of each patent.
4 21 U.S.C. § 360(c) (2000).
49 William E. Holtz, Reassessing Hatch- Waxman Incentives, UPDATE MAG. (Federal Food and Drug
Law Institute, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2001, at 47-48.
0 Id
51 Meaning the term restored for the time spent in regulatory review, the term restored for the
time spent in clinical testing, the time granted through the pediatric exclusivity benefit, and the time
granted through the orphan drug status benefit.
52 Congressional Budget Office, supra note 20, at 42,46. The study included all drugs approved
from the time period between 1992 and 1995. Despite the patent term extensions and exclusivity
provisions that Hatch-Waxman provides to brand name manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies
are somewhat worse off. Their profits for bringing a new drug to market after Hatch-Waxman have
declined by twelve percent. However, it is important to remember that these extensions in patent
term provided by Hatch-Waxman play an important role in protecting the intellectual property rights
of brand name manufacturers. Without them, the rise in generic market share since 1984 would
have resulted in a much more dramatic reduction in the expected returns from marketing a brand
name pharmaceutical. While pharmaceutical companies are slightly worse offunder Hatch-Waxman
than generic manufacturers, a balance still can be said to exist.
53 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(B)(iii) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3) (2002).
54 21 U.S.C. § 355G)(2)(A)(vii)()-(IV) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(1)-(4) (2002).
2003]
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to the brand name drug manufacturer."5 Although preparation of an ANDA is
not an act of infringement, the filing of a paragraph IV certification in connection
with the ANDA is considered to be a technical act of infringement. s6 The brand
name manufacturer then has the opportunity to bring an infringement action
against the generic manufacturer within forty-five days; if he does this within the
allotted time, then the FDA approval of the generic drug is automatically stayed
for thirty months.
5 7
The thirty-month stay provision is a valuable benefit provided to pharmaceuti-
cal companies by Hatch-Waxman. The provision gives brand name manufactur-
ers an opportunity to assert the validity of their patents and litigate their case
before the approval of the generic. This is important because without strong,
enforceable patent rights, pharmaceutical companies will not have the incentive
to invent, which will decrease innovation and limit the development of new drugs.
Hatch-Waxman gives generic manufacturers the right to make the generic version
of the brand name drug and seek FDA approval before the expiration of the
patent, and in return, it gives the pharmaceutical company a thirty-month stay in
which to challenge the generic manufacturer. In this way, Hatch-Waxman seeks
to establish a balance between generic manufacturers and brand name manufac-
turers.
The success of the Hatch-Waxman balance is evident by comparing the
American system for protecting drugs with that of our European trading partners
lacking an analogous system."8 Some European countries, such as England and
Germany, rely on free pricing and competition while others, such as Italy and
France, rely on price fixing.50 Neither European system is as successful as the
United States' Hatch-Waxman regime.' Under Hatch-Waxman, the United States
consistently discovers more innovative and successful drugs than any other
country.61 In addition, last year the United States was projected to be responsible
for approximately sixty-two percent of all breakthrough drugs.62
55 21 U.S.C. 3556)(2)(13)(t) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.95(c)(6) (2002).
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2000).
57 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(B)(iii) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3) (2002).
s See geeralI PhRMA, sxupra note 5, at 8 (discussing the benefits of Hatch-Waxman for the
United States compared to the systems used in European countries).
9 I'd
o Id The countries that rely on the free market experience sharp declines following the
expiration of the patent. The countries that fix prices are simply not competitive.
61 Id
62 Id This statistic was based on breakthrough drugs expected to enter the market last year.
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II. ABUSE OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS
Despite the obvious successes of Hatch-Waxman in assisting generics onto the
market while preserving the rights of brand name manufacturers, there has been
criticism that some of its provisions have been abused.63 Pharmaceutical
corporations have devised several strategies to evade the spirit of Hatch-Waxman
and prevent competition from generic drug companies. Generic manufacturers
also participate in some of these abuses to prevent competition from other
generic manufacturers.
A. ABUSE OF THE 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY PROVISION: SWEETHEART DEALS
1. Overview and Antitrust Law in the Pharmaceutical Industry. The first type of
these tactics is anticompetitive, collusive agreements between pharmaceutical
companies and their generic competitors whereby the generic companies agree to
delay introducing their generic version of a brand name drug into the market and
the pharmaceutical companies pay them in return.' The pharmaceutical company
pays much more than the generic company would have made from the sale of its
generic, but not as much as the pharmaceutical company would lose from the
competition.6 Many of the settlements into which pharmaceutical companies and
63 SeegeneralyJuia Rosenthal, Hatch-IWaxman Use orAbue?Co lmuveSettkmentsBetweenBrand-Name
and Generic Drug Manufacturers 17 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 317 (2002) (noting some of the unintended
side effects of Hatch-Waxman); Elizabeth Stanley, An Ounce of Prevention: Anasis of Drug Patent
Settkments Under the Hatch Waxman Act, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 345 (2002) (discussing the
interaction between complex patent infringement litigation and antitrust laws); Lara Glasgow,
Stretching the Limits of IntletualPropely Rights: Has the Pharmaceuticalndustgy Gone Too Far?, 41 J.L. &
TECH. 227 (2000) (criticizing the various strategies that brand name manufacturers use to extend
their patent term); Marcy Lobanoff, Anti-competitive Agreements Cloaked as "Settlements" Thwat the
Purposes of the Hatch Waxman Act, 50 EMoRY L.J. 1331 (2001) (discussing the rise in anticompetitive
agreements between brand name and generic pharmaceutical companies); Elizabeth Powell-Bullock,
Gaming the Hatch Waxman System: How Pioneer Drug Makers Exploit the Law to Maintain Monopo Power
in the Preription DrugMark*et, 29J. LEGIS. 21 (2002) (arguing that the current system is not effectively
meeting the goals of Hatch-Waxman); David A. Balto, PharmaceuticalPatent Settlements: The Antitrust
Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321 (2000) (identifying problems surrounding the 180-day exclusivity
provision); Alfred B. Engelberg, Speaal Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlied Their
Usefulness?, 39 J.L. & TECH. 389 (1999) (commenting that there has been abuse of the 180-day
exclusivity provision and the thirty-month stay provision of Hatch-Waxman).
" Genetic Drugs: The Stalng Game, CONSUMER REP.,July 2001, at 36. These types of collusive
agreements between brand name pharmaceutical companies and their generic competitors are often
called sweetheart deals or horizontal agreements.
6s Id at 36.
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their generic competitors enter either are or appear to be violative of the federal
antitrust laws.66
Antitrust law is a "body of law designed to protect trade and commerce from
restraints, monopolies, price-fixing, and price discrimination."67 The objective of
the antitrust law is the maintenance of competition." On the other hand, both
the law and public policy considerations encourage the settlement of lawsuits.69
Antitrust concerns are often raised when competitors settle their disputes,
especially when the patentee pays the alleged infringer to discontinue infringing
use.7' This is known as a reverse payment." Although public policy encourages
the settlement of disputes, in reverse payment situations where money flows
backwards, the settlement can have the appearance of violating the antitrust
laws.72 If this agreement is reached to preserve the monopoly of one of the
parties and the attendant monopoly rents, then this results in social losses and is
per se illegal." Indeed, this is precisely the behavior that the antitrust laws74 were
' The principal federal antitrust laws are the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. % 1-7) and the Clayton
Act (15 U.S.C. § 12-27). The FTC derives its authority to act under section 5(a) of the FTC Act
15 U.S.C. § 45(a). See generaly FTC, A Brief Oveniew of the Federal Trade Commission's Investigative and
Law Enforcement Autborsty, at 9, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.htm (Sept. 2002)
(outlining the FTC's power and authority to investigate and litigate claims and enforce antitrust and
other consumer protection laws).
67 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 92 (7th ed. 1999).
68 Id
69 See U.S. Dept of Justice & FTC,Antitrust Guidefinesforthe Licensing of Intellectual Property (Apr.
6, 1995) at 28, available athttp://www.usdoj.gov/atr/pubfic/guidelines/ipguide.htm ("Settlements
involving the cross-licensing of intellectual property rights can be an efficient means to avoid
litigation and, in general, courts favor such settlements."). The guidelines also advise, however, that
"when such settlement involves horizontal competitors, the government will consider whether the
effect of the settlement is to diminish competition between actual or potential competitors." Balto,
supra note 63, at 328 n.44.
70 Daniel Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and
Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REv. 747 (2002). For a discussion of the economic incentives for
generic drug firms signing patent settlement agreements and the resulting risk of monopoly, see
generally Thomas B. Leary, Antitrust Issues in Settlement of PharmaceuticalPatent Disputes, 14 ANTITRUST
HEALTH CARE CHRON. 4 (Winter 2000/2001) and Balto, supra note 63, at 321.
7 Leary, supra note 70.
72 Id See also Balto, supra note 63, at 335 (discussing the suggestion of anticompetitive intent in
patent settlement agreements between innovators and challenging generic firms).
" Crane, supra note 70, at 748,770. One case where emphasis was put on the "directional flow"
of payments was In re Cardizem CD, 105 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 2000). In that case, the court
said that any settlement between competitors that included reverse payments was "inherently
suspicious." Id See also Complaint, Schering-Plough Corporation and Upsher-Smith Laboratories,
FTC Dkt. No. 9297 (Mar. 30, 2001). The FTC has also found these types of settlements to be
inherently suspicious. In its recent case against Schering-Plough, described later in the text, the
major complaint of the FTC was that the settlement included a reverse payment. The FTC was
unable to prove its case though, which suggests that adjudicators and decision makers are unwilling
12
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designed to protect the consumer against. There would be considerably less
concern if the cash flow traveled the other way, from infringer to patentee. Cash
flow traveling from infringer to patentee is consistent with common licensing
agreements. However, in settlement negotiations when the patent owner pays the
company accused of infringement not to compete-and either takes its product off
the market or does not enter the market, it has the appearance of an antitrust
violation.
But again, consensual transactions and settlements are encouraged by our legal
system since they are designed to increase the social welfare and decrease waste."5
The alternative is inefficient and expensive litigation, which ultimately will be
passed on to the consumer.76 The costs of litigation, as well as the costs of
monopolies resulting from anticompetitive behavior, will both result in an
increased cost to the consumer and decreased social wealth. When evaluating
agreements between competitors, one must look not only at the directional flow
of the payments, but also to the intent of the parties in the transaction.77 If the
to look purely at directional flow as indicative of a per se violation of the antitrust laws. Many argue
that all reverse payment pioneer-generic agreements are per se illegal naked market division
agreements in restraint of trade. However, it is better to apply a rule of reason approach and
evaluate all the factors involved. Howard Morse, Settlement of Intellectual Properly Disputes in the
Pharmaceutical and Medcal Device Industries: Antitrust Rues, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 359, 361 (2002).
7 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. % 1-7 (2000); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2000); FTC Act, 15
U.S.C. S 45(a) (2000).
"s Crane, supra note 70, at 749. But see Balto, supra note 63, at 337, quoting FTC Commissioner
Sheila Anthony:
While settlements are generally favored, we cannot overlook other interests and
concerns. Settlements can reduce costs and, through licensing or other similar
means, even speed and engender competition. On the other hand, settlements
between monopolists and would-be entrants are ripe for collusive dealing that
leave the consumer and competition behind. In short, the public's interest must
be represented at the settlement table. This is best left to a court.
76 Crane, supra note 70, at 757-59. According to a 1999 study by the Intellectual Property Law
Association, the median cost of litigation where the dollar amount at risk is $104100 million is
approximately $2,225,000. Anthony L. Miele, Patent Strategy: The Manager's Guide to Profiting From
Patent Portfoos, 15 (2001). The costs of litigation also include the time and energy spent by the
company on the litigation and away from the business. There are also indirect costs such as the fact
that often companies must reveal their trade secrets during discovery. Some of these sort of social
costs may be minimized by protective orders, but protective orders are difficult to enforce, so they
are often not effective.
n Intent, of course, is often hard to ascertain. Looking at the intent or the "good faith" of the
settling parties, however, is the prevailing standard. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co. 374 U.S.
174 (1963) (examining the purpose of the parties as to whether their actions amounted to conspiracy
under anti-trust laws). Since the subjective test of the parties' good faith is hard to determine, as
suggested earlier, often all reverse payments are seen as being violative of the Sherman Act even
though this is not necessarily the case. Another reason why this standard is ineffective is that a
patentee's intentions are virtually always anticompetitive; that does not mean that the negotiated
13
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intent is to diminish competition and preserve a patent monopoly, then the
agreement is clearly a violation that needs to be remedied. However, if the intent
is simply to settle the dispute and avoid excessive litigation costs, then the
agreement is most likely legitimate and should stand.
There are great incentives for parties to settle patent infringement cases out
of court. One reason is the uncertainty that is involved in patent litigation. In
highly technical areas, courts commonly lack scientific expertise and struggle to
understand the complex technology involved. Patent trials are also extremely
expensive since experts are needed on both sides to explain the complicated and
intricate technology to the court. Litigants may be motivated to settle for many
reasons. These reasons must be thoughtfully reviewed when determining whether
there has been an antitrust violation or whether the parties actually entered into
a legitimate legal agreement.
Accordingly, a settlement should not be dismissed out of hand as a per se
violation merely because it arose out of a patent dispute between competitors or
because the payment traveled from patentee to the infringer."8 It is easy to
presume that an antitrust violation has occurred when considering agreements
between brand name pharmaceutical companies and their generic competitors due
to the abuse of the antitrust laws in the pastin this area and the fierce competition
between these two groups. However, all of the factors involved must be
considered, and both social policies of pro-settlement and pro-competition must
be accounted for when evaluating settlements between competitors." Another
social policy must be considered as well, and that is the policy favoring patent
rights.8' Our patent laws create a system of incentives that should not be ignored
when evaluating whether a settlement is truly a violation of the antitrust laws. If
patent owners choose to settle rather than risk their patent rights in litigation,
then an argument can be made that they should be allowed to make that
settlement agreement was reached in bad faith. Perhaps the patentee simply did not want to risk
losing his patent rights in court. The settlement also could be simply a mutual desire between the
competition to avoid the associated costs of litigation. See Crane, spra note 70, at 778 (discussing
approach of examining parties' intent).
" Crane, skpra note 70, at 778-79 (explaining that firms may agree to a settlement where the
patents of each are "anticompetitive" due to the nature of patents and the risk of losing rents).
" Id It would also be beneficial to briefly analyze the merits of the case in making this
determination. Who pays whom may depend on the strength of the relative cases, which could be
indicative of the purpose behind the settlement.
80 U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 8. See also The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. % 1-376 (2000). It is widely
accepted that a patent system increases social wealth; however, some would argue that a patent
system does not increase social wealth and only has the effect of creating artificial monopolies. See
Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 992-95, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 342 (9th Cir. 1979)
(balancing conflicting bodies of law dealing with patents and problems of monopoly power).
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decision."' In the case involving settlements between pharmaceutical companies
and their generic competitors, however, the 180-day exclusivity provision of
Hatch-Waxman makes the anticompetitive effect of these settlements even more
onerous. As will be explained in the following cases, certain types of settlement
agreements between innovator companies and "first to file" generic companies
could have the effect of preventing competition indefinitely.
2. FTC Involvement and Case LawAnaysis. The FTC has been very involved in
policing this type ofanticompetitive behavior. 2 The first action brought involved
a collusive agreement between Abbott Laboratories and Geneva
Pharmaceuticals. 3 The FTC alleged unreasonable restraint of trade" in violation
of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act." Abbott manufactures and
markets a pioneer brand name anti-hypertension drug named Hytrin.86 At the
time of this agreement, Abbott earned $542 million per year, or $45 million per
month, from the sale of this patented drug. 7 Geneva Pharmaceuticals had
obtained approval for a generic version of Hytrin and would have begun to sell
the drug as soon as Abbott's patent expired.8 Geneva expected to earn between
$1 million and $1.5 million a month from the sale of the generic version.8 9
Abbott agreed to pay Geneva $4.5 million per month (ten percent of what Abbott
eams from sales of Hytrin per month) to not make and sell its competing generic
version.'u This amount was less than Abbott would stand to lose from generic
competition but more than Geneva would make from the sale of its generic.
" Others would say that the public has an interest in the determination of whether a patent is
really valid. This would be an argument against the settlement of patent disputes. Another argument
against allowing certain settlements in patent disputes specific to agreements reached between
pharmaceutical companies and generic manufacturers is of course the fact that a settlement could
have the effect of 'putting a cork in the bottle' and preventing generic competition for an indefinite
period of time as will be shown and described in the following cases.
82 The FTC is very interested in protecting consumers from ever increasing drug prices which
nse twelve percent to nineteen percent annually.
83 In reAbbott Lab. & Geneva Pharm., C-3945, 2000 FTC LEXIS 65, at *1 (FTC May 22,2000)
[hereinafter Abbott Complaint]. Abbott Laboratories is a corporation organized, existing, and doing
business under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Illinois. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is an
indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Novartis Corporation and is one of the leading generic drug
manufacturers in the United States.
85 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
' Abbott Complaint, supra note 83, at *4.
87 Id at *6.
u Id at *9.
89 Id at*10.
90 Id
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Under Hatch-Waxman, the first generic company to apply for an ANDA is
awarded 180 days of exclusivity, which starts when it begins selling the drug.91 No
other generic company can enter the market until that 180-day exclusivity period
ends. If that period never begins because of a collusive agreement between the
generic manufacturer and the pharmaceutical company, then other generic drug
manufacturers are prevented from entering the market with a generic form of
Hytrin.92 The FTC ultimately brought this case to a successful resolution,
resulting in a consent order where the two companies had to relinquish their
anticompetitive agreement and agree not to enter into others like it in the future
without prior approval from the FTC.
About this same time, the FTC also filed a complaint against Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc. (Hoechst MRI), and Andrx Corporation alleging anticompetitive
conduct in violation of the FTC Act.93 Hoechst MRI manufactures the
blockbuster drug Cardizem CD, which is a treatment for hypertension and
angina. 4 Andrx submitted an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification to the
FDA seeking approval of its generic version of Cardizem CD,9" prompting
Hoechst MRI's suit for infringement.9 6 The parties decided to settle and pursuant
to their settlement agreement, Hoechst MRI agreed to pay Andrx $10 million per
quarter to not bring their generic to the market.9" Because Andrx was the first
manufacturer to file an ANDA for a generic version of Cardizem CD, it obtained
180 days of exclusivity during which time no other generic could compete.9 s
Because of this settlement agreement with Hoechst MRI, that period never began,
so in effect, all generics were excluded from the market permanently. This
anticompetitive agreement cost consumers $750 million per year.99 The FTC
successfully resolved this case, resulting in a consent agreement similar to the one
9, Or the date of a court decision.
92 This is commonly known as blocking or parking market entry of the generic version.
9 In re Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. & Andrx Corp., No. 9293 (FTC filed Mar. 16, 2000).
Hoechst Marion Roussel is owned by Aventis which is incorporated under the laws of the Republic
of France.
9 Id at 2.
9 Id
96 Id
" Id at 7.
9a Idt
9 In re Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. & Andrx Corp., No. 9293 (FTC filed Apr. 2, 2001)
(Consent Agreement) [hereinafter Andrx Consent Agreement]. Press Release, FTC Consent
Agreement Resolves Complaint Against Pharmaceutical Companies Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.
and Andrx Corp. (Apr. 2,2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/04/hoechst.htm.
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attained in Abbott." ° The parties must dissolve their agreement not to compete
and refrain from entering into any similar agreements in the future.''
Despite its successes, the FTC is limited in what it can achieve in the complex
area of analyzing the inherently difficult, technical, and intricate agreements that
arise out of patent infringement litigations. The Schering-Plough and Upsher-
Smith case, a recent high profile failure, has demonstrated that the FTC has been
less successful in bringing administrative complaints in this area.' Critics say this
highly publicized failure was due to the FTC's lack of experience in cases
involving complicated licensing agreements arising out of complex patent
infringement cases.' 3 However, the FTC has made a commitment to continue
prosecuting these types of abuses of Hatch-Waxman, and as the FTC gains more
experience, it will gain expertise. 4  In addition, the FTC could hire outside
counsel specializing in patent infringement litigation to assist with the prosecu-
tion.1o5
The administrative complaint against Schering-Plough and Upsher-Smith was
brought on March 30, 2001, alleging conduct violative of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act."° The complaint accuses the two companies of entering
into an unlawful anticompetitive settlement agreement.' Scherig-Plough owns
the patent for the potassium chloride supplement marketed as K-Dur 20."0
"00 Andrx Consent Agreement, supra note 99.
101 Id
02 In r Schering-Plough Corp. & Upsher-Smith Lab., FTC No. 9297 (une 27, 2002). This case
is an initial decision in an administrative law proceeding. See general 5 U.S.C. § 557 (2000)
(describing initial decisions). This initial decision by an administrative law judge is subject to review
by the agency (FTC) whose decision can then be reviewed by an appellate court.
"0 Stephen Nagin, The Federal Trade Commission Ties its Hand at Patent Law aith Disastrous ResIts,
PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT., Oct. 2002, at 5.
' Access to Generic Drugs, Before the House Subcomm. on Health Comm. on Eneqy and Commerce, 107th
Cong. (2002), 2002 WL 100237966 (statement of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade
Commission) [hereinafter Statement of Timothy J. Muris]. See also In re Biovail Corp. FTC
Complaint, availabk at www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/biovailcomplaint.htm (stating that the FDA "has
neither the expertise nor the resources to resolve complex patent coverage issues"). But see Tatiana
Boncompagni, Patenty Political, AM. LAw., Oct. 1, 2002, at 3 (stating that two FTC lawyers said that
if the Schering-Plough/Upsher-Smith decision is upheld, the FTC will not have the resources to hire
a flock of patent specialists and may stop pursuing these kinds of cases).
"~s That strategy would.be similar to what the Department of Justice did in Microsoft. United
States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cit. 2001). Nagin, spra note 103, at 5.
"o6 In re Schering-Plough & Upsher-Smith, No. 9297 at 2 (Mar. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Schering-
Plough Complaint], 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
'0 Schering-Plough Complaint, supra note 106, at 6.
I5 d Potassium chloride supplements, such as K-Dur 20, are given to patients who are on anti-
hypertension medications to lower their blood pressure. Anti-hypertension medications have the
tendency to deplete the potassium levels in the body to dangerously low levels, which could lead to
heart disease. Potassium supplements are prescribed to increase potassium levels and prevent the
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Upsher-Smith submitted an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification to the FDA
seeking approval to manufacture a generic version of K-Dur 20 called Klor Con
M20."° Since Upsher-Smith was first to file its ANDA, it received 180 days of
exclusivity to market its generic version, which would have begun when the
generic entered the market. As is usually the case when a generic manufacturer
files an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification, Schering-Plough sued Upsher-
Smith for patent infringement."' On the night before the case was to go to trial,
the parties settled."' Schering-Plough agreed to pay Upsher-Smith $60 million
and Upsher-Smith agreed to wait approximately three and a half years before
marketing its generic drug' and agreed to grant licenses for five unrelated
products to Schering-Plough.'
The FTC became involved with this case since this agreement appeared to be
entered into solely to prevent or delay the entry of the geneic version of K-Dur
20 onto the market."4 Evidence demonstrated that this was indeed the case
because the licensed products were of little value to Schering-Plough."' In fact,
Schering-Plough never sold four of the five licensed products and has no plans
to market those four products in the future."' Also, the $60 million bears no
relation to the value of the licensed products." 7 The FTC concluded that the
effect of this agreement between Schering-Plough and Upsher-Smith unreason-
ably restrained commerce and therefore constituted an unfair method of
competition in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act.' The administrative law
judge who heard the case filed an initial decision on June 27, 2002, dismissing all
of the charges of anticompetitive conduct."9 The opinion said that although
some of the evidence presented suggested the settlement agreement was
anticompetitive, the FTC failed to meet its burden of proof.2 More specifically,
cardiac problems that arise.
'- Id at 7.
110 Id.
Ill d.
112 This would delay all generic entry of a generic potassium chloride supplement onto the market
for almost four years (three years and three months from the agreement plus the 180 days of
exclusivity that will begin once Upsher-Smith begins the marketing).
113 Schering-Plough Complaint, supra note 106, at 7.
114 Id
11 Id at 6.
116 id
117 Id
11s Id at 9.
119 In re Schering-Plough Corp. and Upsher-Srnith Labs., FTC initial decision by Administrative
Law Judge, No. 9297 Oune 27, 2002). This was only an initial decision and is therefore subject to
appeal.
"2 Press Release, FTC, Administrative LawJudge Dismisses FTC Allegations of Anticompetitive
[Vol. 11:47
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the judge held that the evidence submitted by the FTC was too weak to
demonstrate that the $60 million given by Schering-Plough to Upsher-Smith was
not simply to settle the case or license the five products involved as Schering-
Plough asserted.12 1 What appeared to be a clear-cut case was lost due to the
FTC's lack of experience in prosecuting these types of cases.
B. ABUSE OF THE THIRTY-MONTH STAY PROVISION
One of the most often discussed forms of abuse, and the primary focus of this
Article, is abuse of the thirty-month stay provision. As described above, under
the United States patent law, making a patented invention before the expiration
of the patent term constitutes infringement. 2 One way Hatch-Waxman
encourages generic manufacturers to bring their products to market is by creating
an exception to this rule for generic drug manufacturers.'23 Under the Hatch-
Waxman Act, a generic manufacturer is allowed to make the generic version of
the drug and seek FDA approval before the expiration of the brand name
manufacturer's patent. Generic manufacturers may do this because of the lengthy
process of FDA approval, which could be up to three years. Thus, when the
brand name drug's patent expires or is found to be invalid or not infringed, the
generic is ready to be sold.
To balance this benefit given to generic manufacturers, Hatch-Waxman
provides pharmaceutical companies with a thirty-month stay in the generic's
approval if it brings an infringement action against the generic manufacturer. 2 4
The thirty-month stay of FDA approval is invoked when a pharmaceutical
company files an infringement suit within forty-five days of receiving notice of the
generic manufacturer's application with the paragraph IV certification. 125 Filing
of the lawsuit stays the FDA's approval of the ANDA until the earliest of: (1) the
date of the patent's expiration; (2) a determination of non-infringement or patent
invalidity by a court in the patent litigation; or (3) the expiration of thirty months
from the receipt of notice of the paragraph IV certification.'26
Conduct by Schering-Plough and Upsher-Smith (July 2,2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/
07/schering.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2003).
121 In re Schering-Plough Corp. and Upsher-Smith Labs., FTC initial decision by Administrative
Law Judge, No. 9297 (June 27, 2002).
12 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
12 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000); see also Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d 858, 863,221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
437, 441, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984) (discussing testing of generic drugs before the patent
expires).
124 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(B)(1ti) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3) (2002).
125 Id
1- 21 U.S.C. § 355(2)(j)(5)(B)(ii) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(i)(1)(i)(A) (2002). An FTC Study,
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During this thirty-month stay while the litigation is ongoing, the brand name
manufacturer may apply for other patents related to the drug and list them in the
Orange Book too.1'2  Before the generic manufacturer can get its drug approved,
it must file an additional paragraph IV certification re-certifying that the newly
listed patents are invalid or not infringed as well. Again, notice must be provided
to the patent owner, and within forty-five days, the brand name manufacturer can
sue and thus trigger another thirty-month stay. For every subsequent patent listed
in the Orange Book, the generic company must submit another paragraph IV
certification claiming that its drug does not infringe those patents either, and each
time the pharmaceutical company then has the opportunity to bring an infringe-
ment action against the generic company triggering yet another thirty-month stay.
Since the FDA does not police patents listed in the Orange Book,12' and because
no mechanism exists for "delisting" patents, 9 one can easily see the potential for
mischief. Indeed, on a few highly publicized occasions, multiple frivolous patents
were listed for the sole purpose of triggering additional thirty-month stays, and
accordingly, this area of abuse is one of the most criticized aspects of Hatch-
Waxman." 0
supra note 2, at 41-42.
127 Once a pioneer company discovers a new drug and receives approval for its NDA, it does not
mean that all research on the drug stops. Pharmaceutical companies often file patents related to
drugs for which they already have NDAs. Once these patents issue, they may be listed in the Orange
Book as well. Some typical examples of later listed patents include different formulations of the drug
or extended release formulas. These types of later listed patents are entirely legitimate. In fact, it
is desirable that pioneer manufacturers continue research on their existing drugs to improve them
and increase their safety and efficacy.
"2 The FDA has said repeatedly that it has neither the expertise nor the resources to police the
Orange Book. Instead, the FDA has only a limited "ministerial role" in listing patents. 59 Fed. Reg.
50338, 50343-50345 (Oct. 3, 1994). Actually, there is a very limited procedure in place for policing
the Orange Book, but it is inadequate. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f) provides that if a generic manufacturer
disputes the accuracy or relevance of patent information submitted to the FDA and listed in the
Orange Book, it may notify the agency in writing stating its grounds for disagreement. However,
the only thing the FDA does to act on such a complaint is to contact the brand name manufac-
turer/patent holder and ask it whether the listed patent is appropriate. If the brand name
manufacturer responds that the information is appropriately listed and accurate, then the complaint
is dismissed.
'2' See 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2000) (stating that "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) [of this
section, regarding suits by statesi, all proceedings for the enforcement... of this Act shall be by and
in the name of the United States"). This means that there is no private right to sue another party
to delist its patent from the Orange Book. See a/so My/an, 268 F.3d at 1330 (quoting In re Orthopedic
Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1999)) ('It is well settled . . . that the
FDCA creates no private right of action.").
13 Seegemeral/ My/an, 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001) and Andrx, 276 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(illustrating abuse of the thirty-month stay by listing frivolous patents). Again, it is important to keep
in mind that these are isolated cases. Most later listed patents are entirely legitimate.
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To be listed in the Orange Book, patents must satisfy two criteria: (1) the
patent must claim the approved drug product or method of using the approved
drug product, and (2) the patent must be one with respect to which a claim of
patent infringement could be reasonably asserted if a person not licensed by the
owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug. 3' Since there is no
policing of the Orange Book,'32 and since many drugs generate over a million
dollars per day, brand name manufacturers occasionally attempt to list inappropri-
ate or frivolous patents in an effort to trigger multiple thirty-month stays.
1. Mylan v. Bristo/Myers Squibb.
a. Background of the Case. The most often cited example of thirty-month
stay provision abuse involves Bristol Myers Squibb Company (BMS) and their
anti-anxiety drug called BuSpar, which yields $600 million per year or approxi-
mately $2 million per day for the company.' BuSpar was set to go off patent on
November 21, 2000." M Mylan, in the meantime, had submitted its ANDA for a
generic version of BuSpar, with a paragraph III certification and received pre-
approval from the FDA.3 Further, Mylan manufactured tablets and even loaded
all of its trucks in preparation for delivery beginning at 12:00 a.m. on November
22, 2000.131 Twelve hours before BMS's patent exclusivity was to expire, BMS
received a patent for a metabolite produced by the administration of BuSpar, and
BMS attorneys rushed to list the patent in the Orange Book.'37 Once a related
patent has been listed in the Orange Book, the generic company then must file
another certification saying that its drug does not infringe this patent or the newly
listed patent is invalid. Again, the pharmaceutical company then has the
opportunity to challenge, and this automatically triggers an additional thirty-
month stay. Mylan Laboratories had to unload its trucks and go home.3 ' Mylan
brought suit claiming that the patent that Bristol Myers Squibb listed did not
"claim" BuSpar since it was for a metabolite that the body makes when it
metabolizes the drug and demanded that BMS delist it.'39 The District Court
found for Mylan and ordered that the nonstatutory, frivolous metabolite patent
13 21 U.S.C. 5 355(b)(1)(F) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2002).
132 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2002). See also Andix, 276 F.3d at 1378
(finding that the FDA acknowledges that it has no mechanism for review of submitted patent
information), Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulation, 59 Fed. Reg. 50338, 50343 (Oct. 3,
1994) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
133 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D. D.C. 2001).
"4 Mylan, 268 F.3d at 1327.
135 Id.
136 id
137 I
13 Id.
139 Myan, 268 F.3d at 1328.
2003]
21
Robinson: Analysis of Recent Proposals to Reconfigure Hatch-Waxman
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2016
J. INTELL PROP. L
be delisted."t4 That decision was later reversed by the Federal Court of Appeals,
which concluded that a judge could not order patents to be removed from the
FDA's Orange Book.14' Indeed, there is no mechanism whereby patents can be
removed from the Orange Book, and private parties may not attempt to enforce
the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetics Act.'42
b. Extent of-FTC Involvement. Recently, the FTC has shown interest in cases
involving abuse of the thirty-month stay provision of Hatch-Waxman'
4 3
Although the FTC was not a party in this case, it filed an amicus brief with the
court condemning the anti-competitive behavior of Bristol Myers Squibb and
opposing its motion to dismiss.'" In its brief, the FTC addressed BMS's
assertion that since it was "petitioning the government," it was immune from
allegations of antitrust violations under the Noerr Pennington doctrine.4 This
doctrine was intended to protect the right of individuals and companies to
communicate with the government."l' The court adopted the FTC's analysis and
held that simply submitting a patent to the FDA to be listed in the Orange Book
144) Id
141 Idl at 1332. Interestingly, in December 2001, the attorneys general of twenty states filed an
antitrust lawsuit against Bristol Myers Squibb for keeping a generic version of Buspar off the market
as well. These cases were settled on January 7, 2003. Bristol Myers Squibb agreed to settle for $535
million although it "admits no wrongdoing." PR News, BnstolMyers Squibb toSettleAntitrustLtifgation
0an. 7, 2003), avaiakh at http://www.pnewswire.com/news.
142 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2000).
14' Barriers to Entry in the Pharmaceutical Market: Before the Senate Judiciary, 108th Cong.
(2003) (statement of Timothy J. Mutis, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission). The FTC began
pursuing the promotion of competition in the pharmaceutical industry through antitrust
enforcement in cases involving collusive settlements between pioneer companies and their generic
competitors which involve abuse of the 180-day exclusivity provision and have the tendency to
"park" the entrance of the generic onto the market. These cases are known as first generation FTC
litigation and include collusive settlements between Abbott and Geneva, between Hoechst Marion
Roussel (now Aventis) and Andrx, between Biovail and Elan, and between Schering-Plough and
Upsher-Smith. The type of FTC litigation involving the thirty-month stay provision is known as
second generation FTC litigation, and the FTC has only recently become involved with this unilateral
abuse of Hatch-Waxman. Aside from submitting a brief in the Buspirone litigation, the only other
enforcement action that the FTC has taken against this type of abuse is a consent order against
Biovail for its anticompetitive activities in delaying the entrance of generic Tiazac (Andrx) onto the
market. Id Biovadlis addressed in the next section.
'" Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, I re Buspirone Patent & Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.
N.Y. 2002) (No. 1410) [hereinafter FTC Memorandum].
14' Id at 2; see aLso E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961) and United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (discussing the Noerr
Pennington doctrine).
1"6 FTC Memorandum, sipra note 144, at 5-12.
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is not "petitioning the government" and rejected BMS's claim of Noerr-
Pennington immunity and its motion to dismiss.'47
2. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp."'
a. Background of the Case. Another case involving abuse of the thirty-month
stay provision of Hatch-Waxman involved a brand name hypertension drug made
by Biovail Laboratories and marketed as Tiazac 49 In June 1998, Andrx
Pharmaceuticals, a generic company, submitted an ANDA for a generic version
of Tiazac along with a paragraph IV certification that the listed drug patent was
invalid and its generic version did not infringe it." Biovail Laboratories sued for
patent infringement within forty-five days, thus triggering a thirty-month stayuntil
February 2001 (or until a court decides the infringement case).'
In May 1997, a third party, Arnold Lippa from DOV Pharmaceuticals, filed
a patent claiming an extended release formula of Tiazac, which issued in
December 2000.152 Biovail Laboratories acquired an exclusive license to this drug
and in mid-January 2001, listed it in the Orange Book just six weeks before
Andrx's generic version of Tiazac was to go to market. 3 Since the newly listed
Biovail patent was said to "claim Tiazac," Andrx then had to resubmit its
paragraph IV certification."s This gave Biovail the opportunity to file a second
infringement suit and trigger yet another thirty-month stay. As in Mylan, the
generic company sued to get the "sham patent" delisted. Again, the court
determined that there was no mechanism to delist patents from the Orange
Book,' and thus, the generic company was left without any recourse except to
147 Id
141 276 F.3d 1368, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1414 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
149 Id.
'50 Id at 1372.
151 Id
152 Id
,3 Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1372,61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1414, 1418
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
" Although Biovail signed a declaration asserting that the new extended release formula patent
claimed Tiazac, it actually did not. In fact, it was a completely different formulation, but since
Biovail Listed it in the Orange Book as claiming Tiazac, Andrx must recertify. Id at 1372-73.
1ss Interestingly, in dicta, the appellate court's opinion suggested that perhaps there was a way
to get a sham patent delisted from the Orange Book. The court said that it is possible that an
ANDA applicant can sue the FDA directly under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) codified
at 5 U.S.C. % 702-706 to compel approval of the ANDA if they have been "aggrieved by agency
action." Andrx, 276 F.3d at 1374,1379. Since Andrx only alluded to this defense and did not assert
it, the court said that it could not consider it in that particular case. However, in another case, the
FDA was sued directly, and that strategy was unsuccessful. The court found that what the agency
did was not arbitrary and capricious but was a reasonable exercise of its statutory and regulatory
powers. See also Watson Pharm., Inc. v. Henney, 194 F. Supp. 2d 442 (D. Md. 2001) (dismissing case
where plaintiffs sought a mandatory injunction ordering the delisting of a patent).
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wait for the statutory period of thirty additional months to run before it could
begin to sell its generic version of the drug." 6
b. Extent of FTC Involvement. The FTC decided to take action against
Biovail's anticompetitive behavior. This case was the first enforcement action to
remedy the effects of an improper Orange Book listing.'57 In its complaint, the
FTC alleged that Biovail obtained the patent from DOV Pharmaceuticals for the
express purpose of blocking Andrx's entry into the Tiazac market.' The FTC
asserted that the timing of the parties' exclusive license agreement was indicative
of this fact.s 9 As indicated in the discussion above, just as the first thirty-month
stay was set to expire, Biovail acquired this license and prevented the entry of
generic Tiazac onto the market. In addition, the license for the extended release
formula does not even claim the same formulation of Tiazac that Biovail had been
marketing (otherwise Mr. Lippa would not have been able to obtain the patent).
Arnold Lippa's patent could not simultaneously be valid and be listed as claiming
Tiazac in the Orange Book.6 ° Both the timing and the character of the later listed
patent suggested to the FTC that this patent was listed solely for the
anticompetitive purpose of blocking Andrx from bringing a generic version of
Tiazac onto the market in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act and section
5 of the FTC Act. 6'
The FTC succeeded in its action against Biovail, and in April 2002, it issued
a consent order against Biovail Corporation settling all charges in this case.'62
Biovail agreed to divest the right to the patent it acquired and place no restrictions
IS' Andrx, 276 F.3d at 1380.
... Statement of TirnothyJ. Muris, sApra note 104. See also Inr Biovail Corp. FTC Complaint,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002.04/biovailcomplaint.htm [hereinafter Biovail Complaint].
See also Press Release, FTC, Wrongful "Orange Book" Listing Raises Red Flag with FTC; Leads to
Consent Order with Biovail Corp. Concerning its Drug Tiazac (Apr. 23, 2002), availabk at http://
www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/04/biovailtiazac.htm.
' Biovail Complaint, supra note 157, at 4.
159 Id
1, Id at 5.
t FTC,A Brief Oveview ofthe Federal Trade Commission's Investigative andLaw Enforcement Authoriy,
at 9, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.htm (Sept. 2002). The FTC enforces various
antitrust laws through its Bureau of Competition. The two most significant statutory provisions are
section 5(a) of the FTC Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act. Section 5(a) of the FTC Act (15
U.S.C. § 45(a)) prohibits, intera/a, "unfair methods of competition." This includes any conduct that
would violate the Sherman Antitrust Act. Section 7 of The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18) seeks to
prevent and eliminate unlawful tying contracts, corporate mergers, and acquisitions and interlocking
directorates that may tend substantially to lessen competition. The FTC uses both administrative
and judicial remedies to enforce the law.
162 In re Biovail Corp., No. 011-0094 (F.T.C. Apr. 23, 2002) FTC Consent Order, http://www.
ftc.gov/os/2002/04/biovaildecision.htm.
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on DOV's use of the returned patent.'63 In addition, Biovail was ordered to take
no further actions to initiate another thirty-month stay and again prevent Andrx's
generic Tiazac from getting final approval from the FDA."6 Biovail also may not
make any improper Orange Book listings in the future and must notify the FDA
before acquiring a patent for one of its approved drugs and listing it in the Orange
Book.6 ' As the FTC Chairman pointed out in his recent comments to Congress,
"These measures should... send a strong message that the Commission will act
decisively to eliminate anticompetitive practices in the pharmaceutical industry."'
66
C. OTHER TYPES OF ABUSE
Another way that pharmaceutical companies delay the entry of generics onto
the market is through legislative stealth by persuading legislators to add on patent
extensions for certain drugs to "must pass" appropriation legislation.' 67 One
example of this is the two-year patent extension for Daypro, an anti-inflammatory
agent made by Searle, which was added to the end of the omnibus budget bill that
was necessary to prevent a government shutdown.' 68  More recently, the
government has become alert to this scheme, and in 1997, it cut out the rider in
an emergency flood legislation, which included a lengthy patent extension for a
Hoffman La Roche pain reliever.'69
Another way that both generic and brand name pharmaceutical companies
prevent competition is by disabling their competitors by purchasing the entire
supply of active ingredient that competitors need to manufacture a competing
product. For example, Mylan Laboratories conspired with three chemical
suppliers to deprive other companies of the active ingredient for one particular
drug. 7 Mylan Laboratories was involved in manufacturing a generic drug
Lorazepam, which is used to treat hypertension and insomnia, and Chlorazepate,
which is used to treat anxiety and nicotine withdrawal.' Mylan entered into ten-
163 Id at *5.
14 Id at *9.
165 Id at *7-8.
"6 Statement ofTimothyJ. Muris, smpra note 104, at 9.
167 Genertic Drmgs: The Staling Game, CONSUMER REP.,July, 2001, at 36.
168 Id
169 Id
170 FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.C.C. 1999) (No. 1:98CV03114,1:98CV03115).
Mylan is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business by virtue of the laws of Pennsylvania.
Mylan is one of the nation's largest generic manufacturers. At the time this action was brought,
Mylan made and manufactured at least ninety-one generic drugs. Cambrex, Profarmaco and Gyma
are manufacturers and suppliers of chemicals for pharmaceuticals including active pharmaceutical
ingredients (API).
171 Id
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year exclusive licensing agreements with three companies that made the active
ingredient necessary for the manufacture of the drugs.7  These ten-year exclusive
licensing agreements prevented other generic drug companies from manufactur-
ing these two drugs since they had limited ways of obtaining the active ingredient.
Once the market was cornered, Mylan Pharmaceuticals was able to significantly
raise the price of its generic drugs.'73 The price of Chlorazepate increased from
$11.36 per 500-tablet bottle to $377 per bottle and the price of Lorazepam
increased from $7.50 per 500-tablet bottle to $190 per bottle.1 74 This cost
consumers over $120 million, but the FTC successfully prosecuted Mylan, which
was forced to compensate consumers.'
75
As mentioned above, Hatch-Waxman encourages pharmaceutical companies
to test their brand name drugs in children by providing an additional six months
of exclusivity onto expired patents if the drug is tested in children. Pharmaceuti-
cal companies abuse this incentive by testing every drug in children after its patent
expires, regardless of whether children could ever benefit from the drug. For
example, Bristol Myers Squibb recently prolonged its patent for an anti-anxiety
drug by six months by testing it in children.7 6 Most children, of course, have no
need for an anti-anxiety medication.
Another abuse of Hatch-Waxman involves the citizen's petition., This
provision of Hatch-Waxman was intended to give ordinary citizens a voice in the
FDA approval process by allowing anyone to raise concerns about the efficacy or
safety of certain drugs. However, pharmaceutical companies have employed scare
tactics and caused citizens to become alarmed or concerned about the safety or
172 Id at 33-34.
171 Id at 34.
174 id.
1' FTC v. Mylan Labs., 99 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 1:98CV03114, 1:98CV03115,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2OOO/ll/mylandordandstip.htm. This case may have been
decided differently if Mylan could have shown a pro-competitive justification for entering into these
three exclusive license agreements such as being fearful that it would run out of the active
pharmaceutical ingredient (API). However, Mylan could not demonstrate any good reason for these
exclusive licenses, and thus, it looked as if it was just trying to eliminate any possibility of
competition. Further evidence to this was the fact that Mylan also entered into another exclusive
license with a fourth supplier, FSI. When an ANDA is filed with the FDA, the generic manufacturer
must indicate all of the sources from which it will be obtaining its API. It is not allowed to obtain
API from any other sources other than the ones that it indicates in its application. Mylan, in their
ANDA for Lorazapam, indicated that its sources would be Cambrex, Profarmaco, and Gyma. The
fact that Mylan entered into a license agreement with FSI, a supplier from whom it could not even
buy API, indicates that the sole purpose for these ten-year exclusive licenses was to prevent the
competition from obtaining the API.
176 id
177 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2002).
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efficacy of certain generic drugs, prompting letters to the FDA. 7 ' This causes
further delays to the entry of generics onto the market." 9
The generic industry is also guilty of abusing Hatch-Waxman. Because the
first generic manufacturer to file an ANDA with the FDA obtains 180 days of
exclusivity and during this time can charge much higher prices for its generic drug,
generic manufacturers have a significant incentive to be the first to file.
Consequently, many baseless claims are brought to challenge brand name
manufacturers' patents, which wastes judicial time and resources."s Generic
companies also employ the tactic of filing seriously flawed ANDA applications
with the FDA to ensure "first-filer" status and then amending the applications
throughout the approval process while the companies are litigating their cases.''
This also wastes judicial resources and forces the brand name pharmaceutical
manufacturer to litigate against a continuously morphing ANDA
8 2
III. FTC STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE
THIRTY-MONTH STAY PROVISION
In response to reports of abuse and calls for reform, the FTC undertook a
study during the summer of 2002 to determine how prevalent the abuse of the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments is and to determine whether reform is necessary.
Much of the study concerned abuse of the highly criticized thirty-month stay
provision. 3 The FTC examined all instances between 1992 and 2000 where a
generic manufacturer filed an application with the FDA seeking to enter the
market with a generic version of a drug product prior to the expiration of the
brand name manufacturer's patent (in other words, with a paragraph IV
certification). During the time period of the study, there were 104 generic drug
applications with paragraph IV certifications filed with the FDA. Out of these
104 applications, only in eight instances have additional thirty-month stays been
generated as a result of later listed patents." The FTC study revealed that abuse
178 See supra note 167, at 36-37.
179 m
"' "Challenging" refers to submitting an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification asserting that
the application does not infringe the brand name manufacturer's patent or the brand name
manufacturer's patent is invalid.
181 Robert D. Bajefsky & Gregory Chopskie, Biing the Hand that Feeds: Generic Drugs and Abse
of the Hath-laxman Law, 17 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 4 (2002).
182 Id
183 Other parts of the study explored abuse of the 180-day exclusivity provision by collusive
agreements between generic manufacturers and pioneer companies or two generic companies and
abuse of the FDA's citizen petition process as used by brand name manufacturers to oppose generic
applications.
"' An FTC Study, supra note 2, at 40.
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of the thirty-month stay provision is actually not as rampant as critics of the
provision suggest. In fact, the results demonstrate that multiple thirty-month
stays were generated in less than eight percent of all the cases involving generic
applications filed with paragraph IV certifications. Moreover, the delays in FDA
approval caused by the additional thirty-month stays (beyond the first thirty-
month stay) ranged from only four to forty months. In short, the abuse is simply
not that prevalent.
Most of these later-issued patents (patents listed in the Orange Book after the
filing of the ANDA), however, were found to be of questionable character.18 s
The FDA only allows patents directly related to the NDA to be listed in the
Orange Book, such as patents involving the drug substance, the drug product, or
a method of using the drug."s Metabolites, intermediates, polymorphs, and other
tangentially related patents are not allowed, but since there is no policing
mechanism, many inappropriate patents do end up getting listed.s
7
One of the most flagrant abuses of the thirty-month stay provision mentioned
by the study involved the drug Paxil, manufactured by Glaxo SmithKline
(GSI). s88 Apotex8 9 filed an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification to have its
generic version ofPaxil approved.' Under Hatch-Waxman, Apotex was required
to provide GSK with notice of the paragraph IV certification, giving GSK the
opportunity to file an infringement suit and obtain a first thirty-month stay, which
it did. While that infringement action was being litigated, GSK filed nine
additional related patents and listed them in the Orange Book. 9' Apotex had to
resubmit its paragraph IV certifications on each of these later listed patents and
provide notice each time to GSK. For every notification it received, GSK had
another opportunity to bring a separate infringement action and trigger yet
another thirty-month stay. GSK brought infringement actions against Apotex on
several of these later listed patents and generated four additional thirty-month
stays.
92
Other than this case and the BMS BuSpar case, flagrant abuse of the thirty-
month stay provision has been minimal. Still, the FTC recommends that the
thirty-month stay should be limited to one. It also recommends that the FDA
I85 d at 55.
18 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000).
z An FTC Study, supra note 2, at 54-55.
188 Glaxo SmithKline is headquartered in the United Kingdom, but its operations are based in
the United States. Paxil is used to treat various anxiety disorders. Paxil,AboutPaxi" WbatDoes.Paxil
Treat?, at http://www.paxil.com/about/abtrt.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
189 Apotex is a generic manufacturer based in Canada.
190 An FTC Study, spra note 2, at 51.
191 hd
192 ud
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clarify exactly what is to be listed in the Orange Book to prevent inappropriate
patents such as metabolites and product packaging from being listed and
generating additional thirty-month stays. 93
IV. DISCUSSION OF THE NEW FDA REGULATIONS, THE PROPOSED
LEGISLATION (GAAP ACT), AND How THEY ALTER THE CAREFULLY
CONSTRUCTED BALANCE ESTABLISHED BY HATCH-WAXMAN
A. NEW FDA REGULATIONS
The new FDA regulations are unlikely to accomplish their stated objective of
assisting generics onto the market. The rules make the two major changes to
Hatch-Waxman that were recommended by the FTC study. First, they clarify the
types of patents that are to be listed in the Orange Book, and second, they limit
pharmaceutical companies to only one thirty-month stay. However, the FTC
recommendations were merely adopted verbatim without any thoughtful analysis
of how the recommendations should be implemented and without any consider-
ation of the existing legal system in which they have to operate. Consequently,
both changes will be ineffective, or their effectiveness will be limited to
preventing only the most flagrant of abuses.
1. Clarification ofthe Types of Patents that Should be Listed in the Orange Book. In an
effort to prevent the listing of frivolous, attenuated, and tangential patents in the
Orange Book, the new rules clarify the type of patents that can be listed.'94 This
was suggested by the FTC study to prevent some of the abuse that occurs. The
regulation clearly outlines what types of patents are appropriate for Orange Book
listing. The new regulation is as follows:
Patents for which information must be submitted (in the Orange
Book): An applicant shall submit information on each patent that
claims the drug or a method of using the drug that is the subject of
the new drug application or amendment or supplement to it and
with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reason-
ably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner of the patent
engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug product. Such
patents consist of patents that claim the drug substance (ingredient),
patents that claim the drug product (formulation and composition),
product by process patents, and patents that claim a method of use.
Process patents, patents claimingpackagin, patents claiming metabolites,
Id at ii and 55-56.
' New Drug Application-Final Version, supra note 11, at 36677.
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andpatents claiming intermediates are not covered by this section and
information on these patents may not be submitted to the FDA. 95
The new rule clarifies what is inappropriate for listing; however, without also
providing for any mechanism to delist or even police the Orange Book, this
aspect of the new rule will be unenforceable and therefore meaningless. The
FDA has repeatedly stated that it lacks the resources to police the Orange Book
for improper listings, and courts have determined that there is no private right of
action for parties to challenge Orange Book listings.'9 6 Therefore, the listing
requirement clarification provision of the new regulation will be ineffective.
Even if the new Orange Book listing rule was enforceable, it would still be
overbroad and therefore inappropriate. The new listing requirements could
prevent many legitimate product packaging patents from getting listed in the
Orange Book. Although some product packaging is only cosmetic and therefore
unrelated to the claimed drug or does not "claim the drug," other types of
product packaging are an integral part of the drug. Patents claiming integrated
drug delivery systems such as asthma inhalation devices, trans-dermal patches, and
pre-filled syringes should be listable even if ordinary containers are not.
97
In addition, the new rules significantly expand the information that the brand
name manufacturer must include in the patent declaration. 9 Among other
things, the new rules include a claim-by-claim declaration requirement. Under the
statute,patents, not claims, are listed in the Orange Book, and therefore, having to
declare that each and every claim is legitimately listed in the Orange Book is
inappropriate, would be unduly burdensome, and would prevent legitimate
patents from being listed.
2. Changes to the Thirty-Month Stay Provision. The second major change that the
new FDA regulation establishes is a limit of the thirty-month stays to only one.""
Again in its rulemaking, the FDA tried to adopt the recommendation from the
FTC study, but this new rule will not succeed in accomplishing the purported goal
of assisting generics to market.
195 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2002) (where italics indicate recent additions to the current rule).
196 Andrx, 276 F.3d at 1373-74; Myan, 268 F.3d at 1330-32. See alro An FTC Study, supra note
2, at 44 (citing the recent decisions of Andrx and Mylan).
197 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), Comments of the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 13 (2002) [hereinafter PhRMA Comments].
191 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(c)(2)(i) (2002). See also PhRMA Comments, supra note 197, at 17 (noting
that the proposed rule would require submission of detailed information for each claim of a patent).
199 21 C.F.R. § 314 (2002). Curiously, the new rules completely ignore suggestions by the July
2002 FTC Study to alter or restrict the 180-day exclusivity provision which has been arguably subject
to even more abuse than the thirty-month stay provision.
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The FDA tries to limit the thirty-month stay provision by "re-interpreting"
some of the language pertaining to that part of the statute. Specifically, the new
rule re-interprets 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(3)(C), which says that if an ANDA
application is amended to include a paragraph IV certification, then notice to the NDA
holder or patent owner is required. If an ANDA contained a paragraph IV
certification when it was submitted to the FDA, then notice must be given to the
NDA holder, which would trigger one thirty-month stay. Under the new rule, any
amendment to that ANDA application to include additional paragraph IV
certifications (to later listed patents) would not require notice to the NDA holder
because the original application was not amended to include a paragraph IV
certification; it had included one all along.
As described earlier, the notice requirement is what triggers the thirty-month
stay, or more specifically, after receiving such notice, if the brand name
manufacturer brings an infringement action, then the thirty-month stay is
triggered. By reinterpreting the language of section 355(b)(3)(C) to only require
notice for the first paragraph IV certification, the rule attempts to limit the thirty-
month stays to only one.
This change to the thirty-month stay provision is not likely to survive a court
challenge. First, canons of statutory construction dictate that the clear language
or plain meaning of the statute should be used rather than the mental gymnastics
that the FDA used in its reinterpretation of this provision. The FDA's
interpretation of the language was extremely strained and therefore inappropriate.
Second, even the FDA itself has expressed that it lacks the statutory authority to
limit the scope of the thirty-month stay.2" Third, all previous interpretations by
both the FDA and courts have been that more than one thirty-month stay is
permissible."' Also, an agency's interpretation of a relevant provision that
0 Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA), Comments on Patent Listing and 30-Month
Stay Proposals Submitted by the Generic Pharmaceutical Association 32 (2002) [hereinafter GPhA
Comments].
20 See Memorandum of Federal Defendants in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment Declaring Additional Thirty-Month Stay Inapplicable or Eliminated at 5, Andrx Pharms.
v. Biovail Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Fla.), vacatedby 276 F.3d 1368, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1414 (Fla.
2002) (No. 01-6194-civ-Dimitroulas/Johnson). Therein, the FDA unequivocally stated that.
nothing in the Hatch Waxman Amendments indicates that Congress intended
the thirty-month bar to apply only once.... To the contrary, Congress' decision
to link the statutory stay to each individual patent claiming the approved drug,
and not just the first patent, is fully consistent with the balance it struck between
encouraging competition and rewarding innovation.... In any event, the plain
language of the statute makes clear that the thirty-month stay provision of 21
U.S.C. § 3556)(5)(B)(iii) is triggered whenever an infringement action is brought
within 45 days of receipt of the notice of a paragraph IV certification.
Id These comments were submitted to the court by the Food and Drug Administration only six
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conflicts with an earlier interpretation is "entitled to considerably less deference
than a consistently held agency view."
202
In addition to being ineffective and unlikely to survive a court challenge,
limiting the number of thirty-month stays available to brand name companies to
only one stay per ANDA may actually be detrimental to the FDA's asserted goal
of assisting generics to market. The thirty-month stay provision is an important
carrot to brand name pharmaceutical companies. If it is unavailable, as it would
be in certain instances under the new rules, or limited to only one, then
pharmaceutical companies would not have any incentive to submit to Hatch-
Waxman's expedited patent resolution procedures. A brand name company is
only entitled to receive a thirty-month stay in the approval of the generic if it lists
its patent in the Orange Book and brings an infringement action within forty-five
days of the notification of a paragraph IV certification from the generic company.
If this thirty-month stay carrot is not available to the brand name pharmaceutical
company, then it has less incentive to list its patents in the Orange Book or bring
a timely infringement suit."03 This becomes a problem for the generic company
because the generic cannot go to market without risking a later infringement suit
with substantial damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284..21
Generic drug prices are seventy percent lower than brand name drug prices,
and thus, generic company profits are much lower than the profits that would be
lost by the brand name manufacturer if infringement were to be found.
Therefore, a finding of infringement could be devastating for the generic
company. A finding of willful infringement could be catastrophic to generic
manufacturers since treble damages could be awarded.0 ' Consequently, generic
companies cannot risk going to market unless all infringement actions against
them have been settled. Without the thirty-month stay incentive, a brand name
pharmaceutical company may choose not to list its patents and use the Hatch-
Waxman system or wait until the generic is being sold and then sue for infringe-
ment of its patent and obtain huge lost profit damages. Limiting the thirty-month
months before the new reinterpretation was proposed. See also GPhA Comments, supra note 200,
at 32 (noting the FDA's acknowledgment that Hatch-Waxman cannot be read to limit the number
of thirty-month stays).
' GPhA Comments, supra note 200, at 33 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
o3 Although 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(6) states that the FDA has the authority to withdraw approval
for an NDA that does not get listed in the Orange Book by the brand name manufacturer, the FDA
never actually follows this. In fact, the FDA does not police the Orange Book at all. Thus, without
the possibility of obtaining additional thirty-month stays, there is no incentive for brand name
manufacturers to list their patents in the Orange Book.
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (stating that the court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed).
20m
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stay incentive to only one would cause savvy pharmaceutical companies to quickly
adopt a new strategy: sue on the first patent to obtain the one available thirty-
month stay but delay listing or suing on remaining listed patents later on or until
after the genetic goes to market.2 6 There would be no incentive for them to
bring the action any earlier. The only incentive is to obtain an additional thirty-
month stay, which is no longer available under the new rule. This would cause
great uncertainty to generic manufacturers and would create even further delays
in the entry of generics onto the market than under the current Hatch-Waxman
system.
As formulated, the regulatory changes could also lead to gaming of the system
by generic companies. Generic companies could manipulate the proposed
regulation to deprive patent holders of the opportunity to obtain even a single
thirty-month stay when their patents are challenged. Under prior Hatch-Waxman
law, when an ANDA was filed with a paragraph IV certification, the generic
applicant was required to notih the brand name manufacturer (NDA holder).
Under the new interpretation of the statutory language, if an ANDA application
already contains one paragraph IV certification and later is "amended to include"
another paragraph IV certification (to another listed patent for example), then no
further notification to the NDA holder is required. Therefore, no additional or
subsequent thirty-month stay could arise based on the certification because the
thirty-month stay is only triggered when an NDA holder initiates an infringement
action based on that paragraph IV certification.2 "7 In this way, the rules attempt
to limit the NDA holder to only one thirty-month stay.
The new rules, however, could eliminate the NDA holder from obtaining even
one thirty-month stay. Consider the following scenario: An NDA holder has two
legitimate patents listed in the Orange Book: a broad patent claiming a drug and
a narrow formulation patent for that drug. Let us say further that the generic
drug seeking approval would infringe the broad patent but not the narrow
formulation patent. The generic manufacturer could then file its ANDA with its
one paragraph IV certification against the narrow formulation patent (that the
generic manufacturer does not infringe) and file a paragraph III certification
against the broad drug patent (that the generic manufacturer does infringe). Of
course, the brand name manufacturer cannot sue and trigger a thirty-month stay
because the generic does not infringe the narrow formulation patent. Now, the
generic manufacturer can switch its paragraph III certification to a paragraph IV
certification and not have to notify the brand name manufacturer because it
already filed the ANDA with a paragraph IV certification.0 ' Under the prior
PhRMA Comments, supra note 197, at 3.
W7 Id
20 Id at 6.
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Hatch-Waxman scheme,2" if the generic company made this switch, it would then
have to provide notice of the new paragraph IV certification to the brand name
manufacturer, and the brand name manufacturer would have the opportunity to
bring an infringement suit and trigger the thirty-month stay. Under the new rules,
no notice is required for the second paragraph IV certification, and therefore, not
only is the thirty-month stay not triggered, but the brand name manufacturer also
is not even provided with notice that its patent may be infringed. This gaming is
made possible by the new rules.
Neither brand name manufacturers nor the generics industry support the
changes made to the thirty-month stay provisions outlined in the new FDA
regulations. The opposition from both sides of the issue and the apparent lack
of foresight as to the possible consequences of these changes could indicate that
these new rules were essentially just hasty, ill-conceived, eleventh hour political
posturing by the Bush administration.21 ° The thirty-month stay provision portion
of the new rules either needs to be substantially modified or withdrawn.
Overall, the generic industry sees the recent regulatory changes as a "first step"
to reforming Hatch-Waxman but also recognizes that the rules are not well
thought out, will be ineffective, and could even be harmful to the generic industry.
Generic manufacturers strongly urge legislative changes in addition to any
rulemaking. Brand name manufacturers also see the rules as harmful to their
industry, but they indicate that they prefer rulemaking to any legislative changes
and are willing to work with the FDA in modifying the rules.
B. THE GREATER ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE PHARMACEUTICALS ACT (GAAP)
In addition to the new regulatory changes, legislative changes have been
proposed to amend Hatch-Waxman. 211 The Greater Access to Affordable
Pharmaceuticals Act, approved by the Senate last year and reintroduced this year,
proposed sweeping changes to the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.212 Although
Meaning the version before the finalization of the new regulations.
210 The proposal was a surprise move by the Bush administration made two short weeks before
mid-term elections. Some critics even go so far as to suggest that proposing these new FDA rules
was an attempt to thwart the harsh legislation (GAAP S. 812 and S. 54) which has quite a bit of
support in the Senate. See FDA Proposal Could Increase Generics, but Critics Say Tbe've Seen It Before!
Crtics Say it Und rcuts Boarisan Senate Bill, DRUG UTILIZATION REV., Dec. 1, 2002, at 89 (pointing
out that "critics say [the proposed FDA rule is] a pale imitation of the Senate Bill passed in July").
211 These proposed legislative changes have received much more attention in the literature than
the new regulatory proposal. Perhaps this is because the legislation has been around longer. The
rules were proposed in October 2002.
212 The Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act, S. 812, 107th Cong. (2002); The
Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act, S. 54, 108th Cong. (2003).
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legislative changes would be more effective than rulemaking in closing some of
the loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and preventing some of the
abuses, The Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act goes too far in
assisting the entry of generics onto the market and will have a disastrous effect on
the ability of pioneer companies to continue the development of new lifesaving
drugs. GAAP proposes radical changes to the existing system. First, GAAP
would require innovators to list all of the patents in the Orange Book that a
generic manufacturer would have to consider when filing its ANDA and certify
that the listing was complete.213 If a drug is not listed, then the brand name
manufacturer forfeits entirely its right to defend its patent against infringement
by a generic manufacturer.2 14 Additionally, the legislation establishes a private
cause of action for generic companies to sue pioneer manufacturers over their
Orange Book listings,215 and the legislation would limit the thirty-month stay
provision to only one.21 6
1. GAAP Orange Book Listing Provisions. GAAP goes too far in tipping the
scales toward generic manufacturers by giving generic drug companies standing
to sue innovators to have patents delisted from the Orange Book.217 Although
abuse has occurred, the solution to the problem should not be to give generic
manufacturers the right to sue innovators and force them to delist patents from
the Orange Book. This would result in needless, costly, and time-consuming
litigation for brand name manufacturers. As the FTC study demonstrated, except
for a few high profile cases, most of the patents that get listed in the Orange Book
are legitimate, but pioneer companies would be forced to defend themselves in
court for every patent they try to list. The first generic manufacturer to file is
awarded 180 days of exclusivity to market its drug, and thus, it is in its best
213 S. 812, 107th Cong. § 103(a)(C)(iv) (2002); S. 54, 108th Cong. 5 3(a)(C)(iv) (2003).
214 S. 812, 107th Cong. § 103(a)(F)(i)(ii) (2002); S. 54, 108th Cong. § 3(a)(F)(i)(ii) (2003).
215 S. 812,107th Cong. § 103(a)(E)®l)(H)(aa)(bb) (2002); S. 54,108th Cong. § 3(a)(E)®(1)(IL)(aa)(bb)
(2003).
216 This limitation of the thirty-month stay provision to one was actually a compromise. The
initial legislation, proposed in 2000, eliminated the automatic thirty-month stay provision entirely,
saying that innovators instead would have to apply to the court for a preliminary injunction if they
felt that the generic was infringing their patent. In addition to the changes discussed in the above
text, GAAP has an interesting provision regarding the 180 days of exclusivity granted to the first to
file generic. Under GAAP, if the first generic to file does not use his 180 days within a certain
period of time, he loses his period of exclusivity. Instead, those 180 days of exclusivity 'roll over'
to the second to file generic. This provision of GAAP is called the "use it or lose it" provision.
Unlike the other provisions of GAAP criticized above, this provision may achieve its objective of
limiting some of the anticompetitive agreements that delay or prevent the entry of generics onto the
market without having a negative effect on the brand name manufacturer's incentive to invent.
217 S. 812,107th Cong. § 103(a)(E)(i)()(l)(aa)(bb) (2002); S. 54,108th Cong. § 3(a)(E)(i)(II)(aa)(bb)
(2003).
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interest to challenge patents listed in the Orange Book. Pioneer companies will
find themselves continuously defending their listings, and those resources would
not be available for innovator companies to invest in drug discovery. In addition,
courts may not understand the technical and complex rules regarding the
appropriateness of Orange Book listings, and therefore, at least some of the time,
NDA holders will be deprived of their intellectual property because under GAAP,
if the patent is not listed in the Orange Book, then it can never be used to accuse
a generic manufacturer of infringement.
The new FDA rule has a somewhat better approach to the problem. The rule
clarifies the types of patents that should be listed in the Orange Book and
establishes a more stringent declaration procedure for NDA holders regarding
their listing. This solution is not ideal either, however, since it is not likely to be
enforceable. A superior solution to both of these proposals would establish
within the FDA a procedure to police the Orange Book. The FDA has more
expertise than courts in making determinations of the appropriateness of Orange
Book listings based on its greater experience with this technical and complex area
of the law. By establishing a mechanism to supervise, review, and evaluate
Orange Book listings within the FDA, the pioneer companies will be free to list
patents in the Orange Book without fear of multiple lawsuits, and genetics will be
assured that frivolous patents will not be listed (and trigger additional thirty-
month stays) because someone at the FDA is watching out for such mischief.
2. GAAP Thirty-Month Stay Provision. Like the new FDA regulations, GAAP
tries to prevent abuse of the thirty-month stay provision by limiting NDA holders
to only one thirty-month stay, but it takes things further than the FDA rules in
that it also forces the timely resolution of disputes. Requiring all patents to be
listed in the Orange Book (within thirty days of obtaining them) forces pharma-
ceutical companies to participate in the Hatch-Waxman process because under
GAAP, if the brand name manufacturer does not list its patents in the Orange
Book, it completely forfeits its right to enforce those unlisted patents."' 5 Since
NDA holders are forced to participate in the Hatch-Waxman system, the timely
dispute resolution problem encountered with the FDA rules is eliminated. In this
regard, the legislation is likely to be more effective in bringing genetics to market.
However, taking away a patent holder's legitimate intellectual property rights due
to its failure to list its patent in the Orange Book within thirty days seems
inherently wrong. Pharmaceutical industries invest tremendous resources into
discovering new medicines and obtaining intellectual property rights, and
accordingly, they depend on those intellectual property rights for their survival.
'18 S. 812, 107th Cong. § 103(a)(F)(i)(ii) (2002); S. 54, 108th Cong. § 3(a)(F)(i)(ii) (2003).
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Legislation should not be passed with a provision that would cause legitimately
obtained patent rights to be forfeited so easily.
In addition, GA-AP creates yet another way that a pharmaceutical company
could needlessly forfeit its intellectual property rights. If the pharmaceutical
company does not sue the generic company that files an ANDA with a paragraph
IV certification within forty-five days, under this bill, the brand name manufac-
turer loses its right to sue the generic manufacturer for infringement entirely.219
In other words, this bill establishes an arbitrary deadline of forty-five days for a
pharmaceutical company to bring an infringement action against the generic
company to defend its legitimate patent rights. GAAP goes too far in this regard
as well. Legislation that prevents brand name manufacturers from enforcing their
valid and legitimate patent rights is inappropriate and absurd. Patent rights are
established to give innovators incentive to invent. The legitimate right to defend
one's legally obtained patent should not be taken away entirely if not acted upon
within an arbitrary forty-five day deadline. This would have a crippling effect on
the continued research and development by innovator companies.
Many critics who argue that Hatch-Waxman is in need of reform and support
drastic legislative changes to the thirty-month stay provision completely ignore the
fact that legitimate patent rights could be forfeited.2 1 Instead, these critics choose
to focus on isolated incidences of abuse from a few bad actors and conclude that
harsh measures are warranted to prevent continued occurrences of abuse. Other
Hatch-Waxman critics go even further by supporting both harsh legislative
changes andstrengthened enforcement of the antitrust laws in the pharmaceutical
industry. 1 This would lead to an even more unforgiving and hostile environ-
ment for America's pharmaceutical companies and would severely hamper their
efforts to continue the development of new life-saving drugs. Others, although
219 S. 812, 107th Cong. § 104(a)(C) (2002); S. 54, 108th Cong. § 4(a)(C) (2003). Under current
law, if an infringement action is not brought within forty-five days, the brand name manufacturer
loses its opportunity to obtain a thirty-month stay in which to litigate, but under GAAP, the brand
name manufacturer loses its right to sue the generic manufacturer and defend its patent rights
entirely.
o See Rosenthal, spra note 63, at 334 (reasoning that Hatch-Waxman should be amended
because it illegitimately extends the patent rights of pharmaceutical companies); see also Stanley, supra
note 63, at 358 (concluding that the perception that patent litigation settlements cause delays of
generic drugs to enter the market is grounds for amending the Hatch-Waxman Act).
221 See Glasgow, supra note 63, at 257 (arguing that "[w]hile Congressional efforts to close
loopholes in Hatch-Waxman may provide some mitigation, antitrust law must . . . step in");
Lobanoff, supra, at 1355 (reasoning that amending the Hatch-Waxman Act and implementing harsher
enforcement actions will turn the "Act around and will accomplish the Act's original cost-
containment goal"); Powell-Bullock, supra note 63, at 46 (proposing that Hatch-Waxman should be
reformed to "include setting higher standards for patent infringement suits" and "eliminating the
thirty-month stay on generic competition").
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recognizing that isolated incidences of abuse exist in the pharmaceutical industry,
support a more balanced approach that preserves the rights of intellectual
property holders.222
Overall, legislatures face tremendous pressure to take drastic steps in assisting
generics to market due to the increasing prices of pharmaceutical drugs. Despite
these pressures to speed generic drug approval, legislatures and critics need to
bear in mind the huge costs involved in developing new cures and recognize that
the period of exclusivity granted by patent law is necessary for brand name
manufacturers to recoup some of these expenditures. Studies show that only
three out of every ten marketed brand name drugs produce revenues that match
or exceed research and development costs. Profits from successful drugs need
to recoup the $800 million to $1 billion spent to develop the drug and make up
for the millions of dollars spent on the failures.' In other words, pharmaceutical
companies must rely on a limited number of highly successful products to finance
continuing research on treatments. Drugs must be priced accordingly.224 In
addition, studies show that pharmaceutical profits are only slightly above average
for all industries. 225 Legislatures must recognize that although pharmaceutical
companies charging exorbitant prices for life-saving medicines may seem wrong,
the costs of developing new life-saving drugs are also extremely high. Taking
away intellectual property rights, as GAAP does, in an effort to assist more
affordable generics onto the market will jeopardize the continued discovery of
new life-saving medicines by our nation's pharmaceutical companies.
C. NON-REGULATORY AND NON-STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
Clearly the regulatory and legislative proposals to reconfigure Hatch-Waxman
described above are unsuitable. The regulatory changes will be completely
ineffective in increasing access to affordable generics, and the legislative proposal
would be disastrous to the pharmaceutical industry. If anything is to be achieved
by tinkering with the statutory and regulatory provisions of Hatch-Waxman, it
must be through a much more thoughtful and balanced approach than the recent
proposals exhibit. Perhaps the answer is for legislatures and policy makers to not
tinker with the provisions of Hatch-Waxman at all. The FTC study shows that
2 See Kristen E. Behrendt, The Hath-Waxman Act: Balaneng Competing Interests or Smnial of /he
Fittst?, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 24, 2707 (2002) (suggesting that "[glranting patent term extensions
and creating an expedited generic approval process" balances the interests of the Hatch-Waxman).
z An FTC Study, supra note 2, at i.
" PhRMA Publications, Why do Presrcnption Dru gsCostsoMucb? 19(2001), availabk at http://www.
phrma.org/publications/publications/brochure/questions/questions.pdf.
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the abuse is not that prevalent. 226 Maybe the best solution then is to allow the
FTC to continue or redouble its commitment to "vigorous enforcement of the
antitrust laws with respect to generic drug competition."22 7 Although it has been
criticized as lacking expertise in these matters,228 the FTC has had some success
in enforcing consent orders against some of the most flagrant offenders, and as
it takes on more cases like this, it will continue to gain experience. 9 This
solution would avoid the dangerous prospect of dismantling a complex set of
rules designed to maintain a balance between pharmaceutical companies and
generic companies so that consumers ultimately can have both new innovative
life-saving medicines and access to more affordable generic drugs.
V. CONCLUSION
Hatch-Waxman has been successful in assisting more affordable generics onto
the market while at the same time maintaining the incentive for pharmaceutical
companies to design and develop new life-saving drugs. Since its enactment,
however, several areas of abuse have delayed the entry of more affordable generic
versions of drugs onto the market, which is of great concern to many Americans.
Perhaps Hatch-Waxman needs to be reformed to close the loopholes that lead to
some of the more flagrant abuses, but GAAP goes much too far, and the Bush
administration's new FDA rule just gets it wrong. Due to the importance of the
dual goals of increasing access to affordable generics and maintaining incentives
for our nation's pharmaceutical companies to continue new drug development,
legislatures and policy makers either should avoid getting involved and leave
resolving the problems to the FTC or proceed with extreme caution when altering
226 An FTC Study, supra note 2, at 48.
Statement of TimothyJ. Muris, supra note 104, at 2. In addition to increasing its enforcement
efforts, the FTC also should continue its role in providing the industry with guidance and conducting
industry studies through its Bureau of Economics.
22 These matters involve patent and infringement issues that the FTC does not usually handle.
See Nagin, supra note 103, at 5 (referring to a recent high profile loss described earlier by the FTC
in its case against Schering-Plough and Upsher-Smith alleging an anticompetitive settlement that
prevented the generic version of the anti-hypertension drug K-Dur 20 from entering the market).
The FTC's lack of experience with patent cases was cited as being the reason for the loss. However,
as mentioned earlier, the FTC will gain experience as it becomes more involved in these types of
cases. Moreover, the FTC can always consider appointing firms with more experience in patent law
to assist in the prosecution.
' So far, the FTC has been successful in resolving several cases in this area by consent order.
Specifically, the FTC has resolved anticompetitive settlement agreements between Abbott
Laboratories and Geneva, between Hoechst Marion Roussell (nowAventis) and Andrx, and between
Biovail and Elan. As discussed above, the FTC was also successful in the action it brought against
Biovail for violation of the thirty-month stay provision by an improper Orange Book listing.
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the delicate balance that Hatch-Waxman establishes between pharmaceutical
companies and their generic competitors.
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